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NONCONSENSUAL STERILIZATION OF THE 

MENTALLY RETARDED-ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS 

FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS 

I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a mere fiction that sterilization "does no harm ... other 
than to eliminate [an individual's] capacity to procreate. "1 The 
harm of restricting reproduction lies not in the physical conse­
quences of the procedure but in the danger of abusing an individu­
al's basic human rights. Sterilization2 of mentally retarded persons 
raises a multitude of complex legal issues. This comment will ana­
lyze judicial standards within the area of nonconsensual steriliza­
tion. A brief examination of various types of sterilization will create 
a framework for discussion of these judicial standards. Sterilization 
takes three forms: Compulsory, voluntary, and nonconsensuill. 
Compulsory sterilization of certain mental defectives is accom­
plished primarily through legislation. The legislation applies re­
gardless of an individual's competency.3 The compulsory statutes 
originated in the eugenics movement, which began in the late 
nineteenth century and peaked during the 1920's. Eugenics was 
based on the notion that, since human defects are hereditary, de­
fective individuals must be sterilized to preserve and improve the 
human race. 4 The validity of compulsory sterilization statutes was 
recognized judicially in 1907. In Buck v. BellS the Supreme Court 
upheld eugenic sterilization laws as a proper exercise of state police 
power. Justice Holmes' infamous statement emhodies the Court's 
1. In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712,721,157 N.W.2d 171, 178 (1968). 
2. "Sterilization" throughout this comment refers to any medical or surgical op­
eration or procedure that permanently destroys an individual's ability to reproduce. 
3. See notes 15 & 16 infra and accompanying text. 
4. For historical and analytical discussions regarding the eugenics movement 
and compulsory sterilization, see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost 
Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995 
(1977); Kindregran, Sixty Years of Compulsory Eugenic Sterilization: "Three Gener­
ations of Imbeciles" and the Constitution of the United States, 43 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 123 (1966); Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical 
and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189; Comment, Sexual Steriliza­
tion: A New Rationale?, 26 ARK. L. REV. 353 (1972). 
5. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
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reasoning: "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough."6 Since 
that time, compulsory sterilization legislation has been declared 
unconstitutional on procedural due process7 and equaL protectionS 
grounds. In recent years, the theoretical foundation for eugenic 
sterilization has been rejected overwhelmingly by courts and com­
mentators.9 The substantive question decided in Buck, however, 
has not been reexamined by the Supreme Court. While compul­
sory sterilization statutes still exist,10 they are subject to a strict 
constitutional analysis in which a compelling state interest must be 
shown. 11 
Voluntary sterilization is the self-imposed choice of an individ­
ual to eliminate his or her ability to bear children. While an indi­
vidual's decision regarding sterilization may be based on eugen­
iCS,12 more often it is one of family planning. A woman's voluntary 
sterilization decision is regarded by modem society as an accepted 
contraceptive technique13 and has been granted the same constitu­
tional protection as a decision to have an abortion. 14 A mentally re­
tarded individual's choice of sterilization is afforded no less protec­
tion. To ensure that the procedure is voluntary and not imposed 
solely for the convenience of parents, guardians, or institutional su­
pervisors, however, the decision must be scrutinized closely. A 
voluntary decision assumes an exercise of free will, absent coercion 
6. Id. at 207. 
7. See, e.g., In re Hendrickson, 12 Wash. 2d 600, 123 P.2d 322 (1942). 
8. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
9. See North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. 
Supp. 451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976); In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 12 (N.J. Feb. 18, 
1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980) (en bane); 
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 1026-27; Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is 
Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 602-04 (1966); Neuwirth, Heisler & 
Goldrich, Capacity, Competence, Consent: Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentally 
Retarded, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 447, 461-63 (1975); Note, Eugenic 
Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DEN. L.J. 631,643-44,647 (1979). 
10. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-37 (1976); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1, -2 
(1980). 
11. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 
451,458 (M.D.N.C. 1976). For a discussion regarding the state's interest beyond eu­
genics, see Comment, Sexual Sterilization-Constitutional Validity of Involuntary 
Sterilization and Consent Determinative of Voluntariness, 40 Mo. L. REV. 509, 
115-20 (1975); Comment, supra note 4. 
12. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 53-23-102 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 
8702(1) (1968). See also notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text. 
13. See Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices & Dilem­
mas, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 529,533 (1972). 
14. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978). See Comment, A 
Woman's Right to A Voluntary Sterilization, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 291 (1977). 
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or force. ~dditionally, the individual making the decision must 
have adequate information at his or her disposal as well as the 
mental competence to appreciate the decision's significance. 15 
Thus, a person who is mentally incompetent cannot voluntarily con­
sent to a sterilization procedure. 1s 
Nonconsensual sterilization occurs whenever an individual, in­
capable of valid consent, is subjected to a sterilization procedure. 17 
The individual's inability either to give or to withhold consent dis­
tinguishes this category from that of compulsory or voluntary steril­
ization. 1s The importance of the incompetency determination is 
accentuated when it is understood as a prerequisite to any non­
consensual sterilization. 1s The determination of incompetency, es­
pecially in the case of a mentally retarded individual, must be done 
on a case-by-case basis. Decisions based upon the facts particular 
to each case justly reflect the reality that mental retardation is not 
synonymous with incompetency.2o The mentally retarded are far 
from a homogeneous group, and incompetency cannot be generally 
assumed. 21 "An individual suffering from a defect may be able, in 
15. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated & re­
manded, on remand sub nom., Relf v. Matthews, 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975), 
vacated as moot, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). It is important to note that minors 
are often deemed incompetent to make voluntary decisions including those regard­
ing their need for medical attention or treatment. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 
(1979). 
16. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated & re­
manded, on remand sub nom., Relf v. Matthews, 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D. D.C. 1975), 
vacated as moot, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
17. Sterilization proceedings for both minors and adults are initiated by a third 
party, usually a parent, guardian, or state officer. E.g., In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 
295, 378 N .Y.S.2d 989 (1976) (petitioner was the mother of a twenty-two-year-old fe­
male); In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 263 S.E.2d 805 (1980) (petitioner was the 
Department of Social Services); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) 
(en bane) (petitioner was the mother of a sixteen-year-old female). 
18. See In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 13-14 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981). Voluntary 
sterilization requires an individual's consent. See note 14 supra and accompanying 
text. On the other hand, compulsory sterilization can occur without any determina­
tion of competency. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
19. See note 101 infra. 
20. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 399 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, re­
manded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); see Wyatt 
v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1384 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Murdock, Civil Rights of 
Mentally Retarded-Some Critical Issues, 7 FAM. L.Q. 1,3-6 (1973); Comment, Ster­
ilization of Mental Defectives: Compulsion and Consent, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 
187 (1975). 
21. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 43 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); Murdock, supra 
note 20, at 3. 
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spite of that defect, to knowingly and understandingly withhold or 
give consent. "22 
Authority for nonconsensual sterilization is derived from either 
the legislatures or the courts. State legislatures most commonly 
grant the authority. State statutes often empower various parties as 
decisionmakers. Statutory authority either to review or to deter­
mine the sterilization decision may rest with a state agency or an 
administrative board. 23 Parents or guardians also may be granted 
control by statute to authorize a nonconsensual sterilization. This 
exercis.e often is characterized as power of substituted consent. 24 
Yet, some statutes mandate judicial review and require the court to 
make the final determination whether sterilization is warranted. 25 
The power of courts to order nonconsensual sterilization ab­
sent specific statutory authority has been the subject of jurisdic­
22. Comment, supra note 17, at 187-88. 
23. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-502 (1971). The category of compulsory steriliza­
tion is all-inclusive. Thus, pertinent nonconsensual sterilization situations can be in­
cluded within the compulsory category. 
24. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8702(4)(C)&(D) (1968) (although the term 
"substituted consent" is not specifically mentioned within the Vermont provision, it 
is implicit from the statutory language); see, e.g., Ruby v. Massey,452 F. Supp. 361, 
366, 371-72 (D. Conn. 1978). The issue of whether a decision for sterilization can be 
consented to by a third party for a mentally retarded individual who is unable to 
consent has received much attention. A federal court has held that consent of a rep­
resentative cannot impute voluntariness to the individual actually undergoing irre­
versible sterilization, Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974), va­
cated & remanded, on remand sub nom. Relf v. Matthews, 403 F. Supp 1235 
(D.D.C. 1975), vacated as moot, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The role of a parent 
or guardian with respect to a sterilization decision is less clear, however. Historic­
ally, parents have been afforded broad authority over their children in the area of 
medical care and treatment, for example, due to the recognition that "natural bonds 
of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their children." Parham v. J.R., 
442 V.S. 584, 602 (1979). In light of the potential conflict of interest and the nature 
of the rights at stake, however, great doubt has been cast upon the effectiveness of 
substituted consent by parents or guardians for the incompetent, absent review. See, 
e.g., In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236-37, 608 P.2d 635, 640-41 (1980) (en bane); 
Murdock, supra note 20; Comment, supra note 20; Comment, Sterilization and Pa­
rental Authority, 1978 B.Y. L. REV. 380. Consent that is given by a parent or 
guardian on behalf of a mental incompetent can be subject to either administrative or 
judicial review. E.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978) (judicial re­
view to grant sterilization on mentally incompetent children of consenting parents); 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-502 (1971) (petitions are reviewed by a licensed hospital steril­
ization committee). The scope of review may be limited to the appropriateness of al­
lowing the parent or guardian to give consent. The review, therefore, would not ex­
tend to the actual decision made. The validity of such a narrow judicial review, 
however, recently has been questioned. See discussion at note 98 infra. 
25. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25 (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
35-37 (1976); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1, -2 (1980). 
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tional debate. 26 Recently, several courts found sufficient authority 
to entertain and act upon a petition for sterilization despite the ab­
sence of specific legislation. 27 Once the question of jurisdiction is 
approbatively resolved, the court's role within the judicial steriliza­
tion proceeding can vary in form. Court action may consist of ei­
ther reviewing the substituted consent of a parent or guardian28 or 
determining whether the sterilization procedure should be or­
dered. 29 The significant difference between the two situations is 
that in the latter the court is the ultimate decisionmaker.3o 
26. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, rehearing denied, 436 U.S. 951 (1978), 
the United States Supreme Court examined whether a state judge who had granted 
an ex parte order, requested by a mother for sterilization of her minor daughter, was 
entitled to judicial immunity. The Court held that where no law prohibited a court of 
general jurisdiction from considering a sterilization petition, the judge had the power 
to act even if such action would have been legally improper. Id. at 356-57. The Su­
preme Court decision was not dispositive of whether the judge's action was a proper 
exercise of jurisdiction. See In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 667, 294 N.W.2d 540, 
546-47 (1980); Comment, supra note 24, at 384 n.28, 385-86. A number of state court 
decisions have precluded judicial action absent statutory authority. See, e.g., Hudson 
v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310 (Ala. 1979); In re Tulley v. Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 
146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); Frazier v. Levi, 
440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 294 N.W.2d 
540 (1980). 
27. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 36 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); In re Sallmaier, 
85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1976); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 
635 (1980) (en bane). When courts lacked statutory authority, jurisdiction was predi­
cated upon three principal grounds: Parens patriae power; substituted judgment; 
and a broad interpretation of existing general statutory law. Note, Courts-Seope of 
Authority-Sterilization of Mental Ineompetents, 44 TENN. L. REV. 789,882 (1977). 
The parens patriae power of the court was relied on in the cases of In re Grady, No. 
A-23, slip op. at 36 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981), and In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297, 
378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (1976). Sallmaier, however, has been criticized as based on 
questionable authority. See Comment, supra note 24, at 384 n.31. In re Hayes, 93 
Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en bane), based jurisdiction on the broad grant of 
judicial power found within the Washington State Constitution. Id. at 234, 608 P.2d 
at 639. 
28. See In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 542-43 (N.H. 1980). See also notes 90-99 
infra and accompanying text. 
29. E.g., In re Grady, No. A-23 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 
228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en bane). 
30. Under the parens patriae power, the court takes action appropriate with the 
best interest of the incompetent. See In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 659 n.6, 294 
N.W.2d 540, 543 n.6 (1980)". While such action may consist of authorizing parents or 
guardians to make a substituted judgment for the incompetent, the finding of inher­
ent judicial power enables a eourt to determine and order a sterilization petition. For 
example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently held "that an appropriate court 
must make the final determination whether consent to sterilization should be given 
on behalf of an incompetent individual. It must be the court's judgment, and not just 
the parent's good faith decision, that substitutes for the incompetent's consent." In re 
Grady, No. A-23 slip op. at 19 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981). See also In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 
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In the area of nonconsensual sterilization, where courts are the 
ultimate decisionmakers, they often have been "forced either to ex­
ercise [their] power in a standardless vacuum or to create standards 
for decisions in this delicate area without the benefit of legislative 
guidance. "31 This comment seeks to clarify the judicial role by fo­
cusing on the substantive standards and evidentiary standard of 
proof used by the courts to ascertain when nonconsensual steriliza­
tion of a mentally retarded individual is appropriate. 




Mentally retarded individuals share the same constitutional 
protections surrounding procreation as nonretarded persons. 32 In 
the area of reproduction, two fundamental rights have been recog­
nized: The right to bear children and the privacy right to make 
procreation decisions free from governmental intrusion. 
The right to bear children was declared a fundamental one in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma. 33 The United States Supreme Court deemed 
procreation "one of the basic civil rights of man"34 and stated that 
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race. "35 
The establishment of the right to procreate as fundamental was 
clear as to its affirmative meaning: Freedom to reproduce. With 
the emergence of a population-conscious society, courts were 
forced to view procreation rights in a different light. Judicial atten­
tion was drawn to the issue of whether persons had a constitution­
ally protected right to make private decisions36 regarding whether 
2d 295, 297-98, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 999 (1979). But see notes 95-98 infra and accom­
panying text. 
31. In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 665, 294 N.W.2d 540, 545 (1980). This sit­
uation primarily exists when courts exercise their power in the absence of legislative 
authority. The necessity for judicially formulated standards, however, may also arise 
when courts are given power to act through legislation without standards and statu­
tory definitions. See In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 543 (N.H. 1980); In re Johnson, 
45 N.C. App. 649, 653, 263 S.E.2d 805,808 (1980). 
32. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1973, 1974). 
33. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
34. Id. at 541. 
35. Id. 
36. Procreation decisions refer to voluntary decisions by individuals capable of 
consent. See text accompanying note 15 supra. An incompetent individual is unable 
to make a meaningful decision on whether to procreate. Such a decision is incident 
to a person's right of privacy and "should not be discarded solely on the basis that 
her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice." In re Grady, No. A-23, 
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or not to bear children. Consequently, in Griswold v. Connecti­
cut37 the right to free choice regarding procreation within the mar­
ital relationship was found to be protected by the zone of privacy 
created through various constitutional guarantees. 38 This protection 
later was extended to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird:39 "[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov­
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per­
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."40 Noncon­
sensual sterilization constitutes a serious invasion of this privacy 
right and extinguishes the protected right of procreation. 41 There­
fore, the standards employed by a court to resolve a sterilization 
question necessarily must reflect the constitutional limitations upon 
the infringement of a mentally retarded individual's fundamental 
rights. 
III. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
AS THE BASIS FOR NONCONSENSUAL STERILIZATION 
Although fundamental rights are recognized as deserving the 
utmost protection, they are not absolute. State deprivation of 
fundamental rights must withstand strict scrutiny.42 This analysis 
demands that interests43 served by the infringement must be suffi­
ciently compelling to outweigh the constitutionally afforded protec­
tion. Further, the deprivation will not be permitted if the interest 
slip op. at 18 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981) (quoting In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41 355 A.2d 
647,664, cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)). 
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
38. Id. at 484-85. 
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
40. [d. at453. Further, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
found that the right to privacy encompasses decisions made both before and after 
conception. This privacy protection is afforded irrespective of age and thus covers 
minors. See Carey v. Population Serv's. Infl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parent­
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
41. As early as 1942 the potential dangers of unrestrained sterilization were re­
alized: "[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and 
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are in­
imical to the dominant group to wither and disappear." 316 U.S. at 541. 
42. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
43. The reasons stated by a third party, either the parents or the state, will be 
considered "state interests" for the purposes of this comment. Parents may seek ster­
ilization of their mentally retarded children for reasons other than the child's well­
being. They may wish to avoid the economic and social costs of caring for grandchil­
dren, or the possible social stigma, or they simply may seek peace of mind. See note 
24 supra. Parents may also assert the state interests that follow in text. 
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can be achieved by less drastic means. 44 When an individual is 
unable to consent to sterilization, two intere.sts may be advanced to 
override his or her right to procreate. The asserted justifications 
may be the state's interest either in the health and welfare of po­
tential offspring or in the best interest of the individual. 45 
A. Health and Welfare of Potential Offspring 
Regard for possible progeny focuses on the harm resulting 
from a defective genetic heritage and an inadequate family environ­
ment. 46 The concern surrounding inheritable deficiencies rarely is 
justified and therefore is suspect. In most instances, children born 
to mentally retarded individuals will not have genetic defects. 47 
When an individual is suffering from mental retardation due to an 
identifiable genetic mechanism, it is likely that the individual also 
may be sterile. 48 This professed societal interest in benefiting the 
unborn child unmistakably smacks of eugenics, that is, purity of 
the human race, and is equally unacceptable. 
Society's concern that environmental factors may have a 
damaging impact on the possible offspring of mentally retarded 
persons has scientific support. A recent theory asserts the proposi­
tion that "a child who was normal when born could be seriously re­
tarded by the inadequate environment provided by his mentally 
defective parents. "49 The environmental theory of retardation is 
valid only if buttressed. by specific facts and circumstances sur­
rounding a particular sterilization decision. Otherwise, many re­
tarded persons who possess the capability of being or becoming 
good parents50 unjustifiably would be denied the opportunity to 
raise a family. Additionally, sterilizations based on a broad applica­
tion of the environmental theory ultimately may serve a public in­
44. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
45. See, e.g., id.; In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 102-03, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976); 
In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (en bane). 
46. See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 
F. Supp. 451, 454 (M.D.N.C. 1976). 
47. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 235-36, 608 P.2d 635, 639-40 (1980) (en 
bane). See also note 9 supra. 
48. As of 1961, for example, only seven cases of Down's Syndrome women with 
children had been reported, and there are no reported cases involving a Down's Syn­
drome father. Forssman, Lehmann & Thysell, Reprcorluction in Mongolism, 65 AM. J. 
MENT. DEFIC. 495, 495 (1961). 
49. Comment, supra note 4, at 357. Contra, Note, Retarded Parents in Neglect 
Proceedings: The Erroneous Assumption of Parental Inadequacy, 31 STAN. L. REV. 
785,801 (1979). 
50. See note 60 infra. 
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terest associated not with the health of the child but with the bur­
den that the child may impose on society. 51 When an incompetent 
parent is unable to supply adequate child care, state intervention 
in order to protect the child may be necessary. Removal of chil­
dren from inadequate homes or publicly assisted family support 
services inevitably would create a financial burden on the state. 52 
A fundamental right, however, should not be deprived on the basis 
of the increased costs that its exercise may cause. 53 
B. In the Best Interest of the Individual 
Nonconsensual sterilization also may be justified when it is in 
the best interest of the individual. 54 The fundamental right to pro­
create should not be violated unless contraception is shown to be 
necessary to the individual's well-being. Sterilization can fulfill this 
contraceptive need; but, due to the drastic nature of this irreversi­
ble procedure and its long lasting and possibly detrimental emo­
tional effects,55 it remains an extreme method of birth control. 
To ensure that the person's fundamental right to private 
choice is not abridged unnecessarily, the court must be sure that 
the individual does not have the potential to make his or her own 
decision concerning sterilization. Age and educability of the men­
tally deficient are key indicators of this potential. 56 In the case of a 
minor incompetent, special attention should be paid to whether 
the individual might possibly develop the facilities necessary to 
make an informed decision. 57 Unless the incompetency is perma­
nent, judicial intervention is not warranted. 
51. See, e.g., In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 103,221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976). 
52. See Comment, supra note 4, at 357. 
53. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (equal protection 
case). Note that even when strict judicial scrutiny is not the required test for 
evaluating a state asserted interest, administrative costs alone are not a sufficient rea­
son to deprive an individual of constitutionally protected rights. See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
54. In re Grady, A-23, slip op. at 40 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); North Carolina Ass'n 
for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 454-55 (M.D.N.C. 1976); 
In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980) (en bane). 
55. See Kindregan, supra note 4, at 139-40. 
56. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980) (en bane). As 
many as 25% of the residents of institutions for the mentally retarded may be suffer­
ing from correctible emotional or physical disabilities. Bayles, Sterilization of the 
Retarded: In Whose Interest?, The Legal Precedents, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37, 
41 (1978). 
57. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 42 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); In re Hayes, 93 
Wash. 2d 228, 239, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (en bane). 
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Factors that most readily indicate a need for sterilization in­
clude: Danger to health, inability to parent, and absence of a less 
restrictive alternative. 58 When procreation would endanger the life 
or severely impair the health of the mentally retarded person, ster­
ilization may be required for medical reasons. Such situations stand 
apart from ,the instant issue of providing steri,lization as a non­
therapeutic contraceptive technique. 
Consideration of a mentally retarded person's ability to parent 
entails examination, from the individual's perspective, of his or her 
capability to shoulder the burdens of child rearing. 59 Mental retar­
dation does not in itself suggest parental inadequacy.60 Empirical 
research has revealed that mentally retarded parents can provide 
the skills traditionally associated with adequate parenting. Those 
skills include bestowing love and affection, performing housekeep­
ing tasks, meeting a child's physical needs, and providing intellec­
tual stimulation. 61 It is important to note that the court would not 
have to find that the parenting skills exceed the level of ade­
quacy.62 The court's inquiry should not be whether a parent is su­
perior to all others but whether the parent can satisfactorily pro­
vide care to a child. 63 Some mentally retarded persons who are 
able to function and meet their own needs may be unable to sus­
tain the burden of family responsibilities. 64 Evidence that any chil­
dren born to the retarded individual probably will suffer from a 
purely genetic or an environmentally caused defect65 woul~ surely 
be a factor in determining a person's capacity to meet the demands 
of parenthood. 
Permanent mental incompetence also has raised serious doubts 
about parental ability. This belief primarily rests on two grounds. 
The first is that a correlation exists between inability to consent to 
a sterilization and capability to parent. 66 
58. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 237, 608 P.2d 635, 640-41 (1980) (en bane), 
59, See In re Grady, No, A-23, slip op. at 36 (N,J. Feb, 18, 1981). 
60. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236-37, 608 P,2d 635, 640-41 (1980) (en 
bane); Mickelson, Can Mentally Deficient Parents be Helped to Give Their Children 
Better Care?, 61 AM. J, MENT. DEFIC, 516, 532 (1949). 
61. Note, supra note 49, at 797, 
62. See text accompanying notes 83-84 infra, 
63. Cf. Note, supra note 49, at 797 (neglect proceedings). 
64. See In re Moore, 289 N.c' 95, 104, 221 S,E.2d 307, 313 (1976); In re 
Johnson, 45 N,C, App, 649, 653-54, 263 S,E.2d 805, 809 (1980). 
65. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. 

66, Bayles, supra note 56, at 40-41. 
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A person who cannot comprehend the consequences of, and 
alternatives to, sterilization often lacks the basic capacity to -un­
derstand long-range interests. A parent must consider and make 
judgments concerning a child's medical welfare. If a person is in­
capable of making such judgments for herself, then she is surely 
incapable of making them for others. 67 
Second, if an individual is unable to provide for self-needs, she or 
he likewise will be incapable of caring for the needs of a child. 68 
Generally, these assumptions are well founded; broad acceptance, 
however, leaves room for abuse. Creating a per se category of 
parental incompetents eases the burden of those resolving the ster­
ilization issue. This directly conflicts with the desire to protect indi­
viduals from unwarranted sterilizations. Application of these assump­
tions within the context of each individual case offers safeguards to 
the incompetent. 
Factors demonstrating the need for sterilization must be con­
sistent with the constitutional doctrine of least restrictive alterna­
tives. 69 That is, intrusion by the state must have minimal impact 
upon an individual's fundamental rights. This doctrine primarily 
demands that the contraceptive measure approved by the court en­
tails the least physical invasion to the body. Less drastic forms of 
birth control such as IUD's, antifertility drugs, or sex education 
must be considered infeasible before an individual is irreversibly 
deprived of his or her capacity to procreate. 
In the context of parenting, the least restrictive alternatives 
doctrine mandates an inquiry into whether an individual incapable 
of providing adequate care alone would be able to parent compe­
tently with assistance. 7o Parental assistance may take the form of 
practical training focusing on child health care and child rearing 
skills. Alternatively, support and supervision by others may be 
provided to increase the individual's ability to parent.71 Steriliza­
67. Id. at 41. 
68. Id. 
69. See text accompanying note 44 supra. 

- 70. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 238, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980) (en bane). 

71. For example, support may be provided by a competent spouse, see In re 
Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 44 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981), or by community social or health 
care services. The requirement of a provision that mandates examination of the effect 
that support services and training may have on an individual's ability to parent raises 
several important issues beyond the s~ope of this comment including: What 
standards should govern the decision of whether assistance in any given situation is 
feasible; what qualifications determine whether a mentally retarded individual re­
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tion cannot be authorized if the ability to parent can be realized 
with outside assistance or if less drastic forms of contraception are 
available. 
C. 	 Inappropriateness of State Interest in Potential Life 
as Basis for Nonconsensual Sterilization 
Although the state interest in potential life72 may legitimately 
justify the deprivation of the right to procreate, it should not be 
used in the nonconsensual sterilization setting. 73 Three factors exist 
which lend support to this conclusion: 1lle right to privacy sur­
rounding procreation decisions; the incorporation of the potential 
life interest within the best interest of the individual; and the doc­
trine of least' restrictive alternatives. 
Judicial qeterminations within the nonconsensual ,ste,riHzation ' 
category are mad~ when persons are unable to exerCise their ,right 
to make private decisions' regarding procreation. The necessity' of 
judicial' intervention, does ,not dimiilisha person:s constitutional 
right to reproductive autonomy.74 1llus, a court's judgment should" 
be "consistent with the relative weights of the respective' interests' " 
. 	 I d "75mvo ve .... 
Court-ordered sterilization may be supported by two interests 
that arise from the state's concern with the impact of the steriliza­
tion decision upon society and upon the individual. Society's inter­
est lies in preventing the birth of genetically defective children and 
in avoiding the burdens that neglected children place upon the 
community at large. 76 Concern for the individual similarly involves 
a consideration of potential life. A decision that sterilization is in 
the best interests of an individual necessarily includes an examina­
tion of the person's ability to parent. As previously discussed,77 the 
consequences of bearing a defective child are intrinsic to this analy­
sis. 
Although both justifications share a concern for potential life, a 
, determination founded on the best interest of the individual signifi­
ceives assistance, Le., extent of handicap; and what quality and quantity of services 

must be provided. ­
72. 	 See text accompanying notes 46-53 supra. 
73. 	 In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 37 n.8, 37-38 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981). 
74. ld. at 36. 
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 

struck a balance between the state interest in potential life and a woman's right to 

privacy concerning an abortion decision. 

76. 	 See text accompanying notes 46-53 supra. 
77. 	 See text accompanying notes 58-64 supra. 
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cantly differs from one that embraces society's interest. A decision 
that reflects the best interests of an individual is "designed to fur­
ther the same interests she might pursue had she the ability to de­
cide herself'78 and thereby affords maximum protection to an in­
competent's privacy right to make reproduction choices. On the 
other hand, a decision from the perspective of society inherently 
conflicts with the privacy notion that procreation decisions are to 
be free from governmental intrusion. Thus, judicial intervention 
based exclusively on the best interest of the individual incorporates 
a concern for potential life and ensures that an incompetent's pri­
vacy rights are amply protected. 
Consideration of an independent societal interest in potential 
life also would undercut the protection provided by the least re­
strictive alternatives doctrine. A clear example of this exists within 
North Carolina. Under that state's statutory scheme,79 a district 
court judge can order a nonconsensual sterilization when a men­
tally retarded individual "would probably be unable to care for a 
child or children."8o The statute's purpose was clear: To prevent 
the birth of a child who cannot be cared for by his or her par­
ent(s).81 The legislature, however, was not clear in defining what 
conditions would demonstrate an inability to provide proper care. 
The North, Carolina Court of Appeals, in In re johnson,82 at­
tempted to clarify the standard. The court instructed the trial 
judges to determine an individual's parental ability by appraising 
whether a minimum standard of care could be established. 83 A per­
son's ability to provide minimum care would be shown when it was 
probable that a "reasonable do~estic environment for the child" 
would be maintained. 84 
.The court's definition stressed the need to balance both the in­
dividual's fundamental rights and the concerns of the state. It is in­
7B. In re Grady, No, A-23, slip op. at 36 (N.}. Feb. 1B, 19B1). 
79. While this comment's focus is upon judicial action absent legislative guid­
ance, an examination of North Carolina's statutory scheme, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 
(1976), provides insight into the conflict between the least restrictive alternative doc­
trine and consideration of society's concern for potential life. 
BO. Id. The statute additionally provides for sterilization when procreation 
would likely lead to the birth of a defective child. Id. 
B1. In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 653, 263 S.E.2d B05, BOB (19BO). The soci­
etal concern underlying the statute is twofold: the state is interested in both the best 
interest of the individual and the burden that uncared for children impose on soci­
ety. In re Moore, 2B9 N.C. 95, 103-04, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312-13 (1976). 
B2. 45 N.C. App. 649, 263 S.E.2d B05 (19BO). 
83. Id. at 653, 263 S.E.2d at B09. 
84. Id. 
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adequate because it stems from the belief that the state has a sepa­
rate and valid societal interest in preventing the birth of children 
who will be a burden on the state.85 The definition fails to provide 
sufficient protection for mentally retarded individuals because it 
does not include a least restrictive alternatives test. Johnson directs 
the district judge to inquire whether a reasonable family environ­
ment would exist. There is no requirement, however, that the 
judge consider whether the parent's ability to care for a child 
would be adequate if assistance were provided. Thus, while mini­
mal protection is afforded, the mentally retarded persons subject to 
North Carolina law do not receive protection commensurate with 
the nature of their fundamental rights. 
In order to provide the utmost protection to individuals who 
face the possibility ()f nonconsensual sterilization, the court should 
make its decision solely on the basis of the best interest of the indi­
vidual. A nonconsensual sterilization determination predicated 
upon the person's best interest preserves the individual's right to 
make private reproduction decisions, maximizes constitutional safe­
guards by assimilating the use of the least restrictive alternatives 
doctrine, and satisfactorily takes into account the only legitimate 
societal interest: The health of possible offspring. 




To ensure that the personal rights implicated in nonconsensual 
sterilization decisions are given proper consideration, guidelines 
must be promulgated that incorporate constitutional restraints and 
set· forth permissible grounds for· authorizing the procedure. The 
contents of substantive standards are far from consistent among the 
courts. Several have attempted to fashion a framework in which 
nonconsensual sterilization may be ordered. While similar proce­
dural safeguards have been prescribed,86 formulation of substantive 
85. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. North Carolina statutes allow 
petitions for sterilization of mental defectives when in the best interest of the men­
tal, moral, or physical improvement of the individual or for the public good. N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 35-37 (1976). 
86. Procedural due process requires that the incompetent be represented by 
counsel throughout the sterilization proceeding. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 
349, rehearing denied, 436 U.S. 951 (1978); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383 
(M.D. Ala. 1974); In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 543 (N.H. 1980); In re Grady, No. 
A-23, slip op. at 41 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 295-98, 378 
N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (1976); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 238, 608 P.2d 635, 640 
(1980) (en bane). See also text accompanying notes 102 & 112 infra. 
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requirements have been far from uniform and, in some instances, 
inadequate. 
An extreme example of inadequate substantive protection is 
illustrated by a New York decision. In In re Sallmaier87 a New 
York court authorized sterilization for a twenty-two-year-old se­
verely retarded incompetent female after concluding that the pro­
cedure would be in her best interest. 88 The court reached this de­
cision after consulting psychiatric experts and receiving testimony 
by the guardian ad litem. 89 No standards of any kind were articu­
lated by the court to govern present or future nonconsensual 
sterilization decisions. 
A New Hampshire court's effort to create sufficient standards 
yielded a result similar to that reached in New York. Under a New 
Hampshire law the probate court was designated to be the proper 
decisionmaker in sterilization cases.90 The statute, however, was si­
lent as to when and under what conditions a probate judge may ex­
ercise his or her power. "[T]he absence of standards and statutory 
definitions requires that the courts construe and apply the statutory 
provisions to the evidence in each case so as to adequately protect 
the respondent's fundamental rights."91 The New Hampshire Su­
preme Court, in In re Penny N., 92 attempted to resolve this prob­
lem by delineating a framework within which the probate judge 
must determine whether sterilization approval is warranted. In 
Penny, a probate judge was petitioned to authorize a fourteen-year­
old girl's parents to consent to her sterilization.93 The supreme 
court held that the probate court could "permit a sterilization after 
making specific written findings ... that it is in the best interest of 
the incapacitated ward, rather than the parents' or the public's con­
venience, to do so. "94 The specific requirements established by the 
court for a judge to follow in making a sterilization decision rested 
upon those developed by the New Jersey trial court in In re 
Grady.95 Specifically, a judge must be satisfied "that the applicants 
have demonstrated their~good faith and that their concern is for the 
best interests of the ward. "96 
87. 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1976). 
88. Id. at 297-98,378 N.Y.S.2d at 991. 
89. Id. . 
90. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25, I(e) (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
91. In re Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 649, 652, 263 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1980). 
92. 414 A.2d 541 (N.H. 1980). 
93. Id. at 542. 
94. Id. at 543. 
95. 170 N.J. Super. 98, 405 A.2d 851 (1979). 
96. 414 A.2d at 543. In addition, the court required that: 
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The New Hampshire court's reliance on Grady stemmed pri­
marily from the factual similarities between the two cases.97 This 
dependence on Grady's reasoning resulted in the adoption of 
standards that conflict with the New Hampshire statute's purpose. 
The guidelines articulated in Grady assess the appropriateness of 
parents as decisionmakers.98 The New Hampshire law provides: 
"no guardian may give consent for ... sterilization ... unless the 
procedure is first approved by order of the probate court. "99 Al­
though this statute directed the probate court to make an inde­
pendent assessment, the guidelines accepted by the supreme court 
in Penny did not indicate when sterilization would be in the best 
interest of the individual. Instead, the standards only seek to as­
[the court) must first appoint an independent guardian ad litem to act as 
counsel for the "incapacitated" ward, with full opportunity to present proofs 
and cross-examine witnesses. At a hearing, medical testimony and all other 
relevant testimony and records must be presented to the court. The court 
must be satisfied that the ward is "incapacitated" within the meaning of 
RSA 464-A:2, XI .... 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
97. In both cases parents brought sterilization petitions for their minor daugh­
ters who suffered from Down's Syndrome. 414 A.2d at 542; 170 N.J. Super. at 101, 
405 A.2d at 852. 
98. In In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 405 A.2d 851 (1979), the court under its 
parens patriae power examined the appropriateness of the paI:ents' substituted 
consent for the sterilization of their minor daughter. This determination rested upon 
court-created standards of review. Id. at 125-27, 405 A.2d at 865. The Grady court's 
main inquiry hinged on whether the interests of the parents were congruent with 
those of the chil~, that is, whether the parents were acting in the child's best 
interest: 
[ilt is not for this court to substitute its judgment for the informed consent of 
Lee Ann Grady nor, as has been suggested, to weigh the relative advantages 
and risks of other methods of contraception. It is, instead, appropriate under 
these circumstances, having set forth an-d followed all appropriate proce­
dural safeguards, to authorize and emp~wer her parents as general guardians 
to decide as they deem she would were she capable of informed judgment. 
This may include, in their sound discretion, the exercise of their substituted 
consent to any method of temporary or permanent contraception .... 
Id. at 126-27, 405 A.2d at 865-66. See also Note, Sterilization, 18 J. FAM. L. 648 
(1980). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has subsequently vacated that part of the trial 
court's holding that gave parents or guardians full discretion with regard to consent 
decisions. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 9 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1981). This recent rever­
sal rested on the belief that the substance of consent for sterilization must come from 
the court, not from the parents: "[i)ndependent judicial decisionmaking is the best 
way to protect the rights and interests of the incompetent and to avoid abuses of the 
decision to sterilize." Id. at 21. 
99. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25, I(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (emphasis 
added). 
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sur.e that the parents' or guardians' interests are not controlling. 
The failure to determine what constitutes the best interest of the 
incapacitated person leaves the New Hampshire probate courts 
without the necessary guidelines to fulfill their statutory duty to 
approve sterilization procedures. 
One court, without any legislative authority or guidance, took 
the initiative to develop comprehensive standards governing non­
consensual sterilization proceedings. In In re Hayes 100 the Su­
preme Court of Washington established an array of procedural and 
substantive standards that must be met prior to any sterilization 
order. 101 The decision can be made only in a proceeding that con­
tains the following procedural safeguards: "(1) The incompetent in­
dividual is represented by a disinterested guardian ad litem, (2) the 
court has received independent advice based upon a comprehen­
.. 'sive medical, psychological, and social evaluation of the individual, 
arid (3) to the greatest extent possible, the court has elicited and 
taken into account the view of the incompetent individual. "102 
Within this framework the judge must find that the evidence 
indicates a need for contraception. This need is indicated if the 
court finds that the individual is: 
(1) physically capable of procreation, and 
(2) likely to engage in sexual activity at the present or in the 
near future under circumstances likely to result in pregnancy, 
and ... 
(3) the nature and extent of the individual's disability as deter­
mined by empirical evidence and not solely on the basis of 
standardized tests, renders him or her permanently incapable of 
caring for a child, even with reasonable assistance. 103 
Finally, there must be no alternative to sterilization. The judge 
must find: "(1) All less drastic contraceptive methods, including su­
pervision, education and training, have been proved unworkable or 
inapplicable, and (2) the proposed method of sterilization entails 
100. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en bane). 
101. Inability to consent must he determined first. The Hayes court set the fol­
lowing framework for determination of the ability to consent: "the judge must find 
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the individual is (1) incapable of mak­
ing his or her own decision about sterilization, and (2) unlikely to develop suffi­
ciently to make an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable future." 
Id. at 238,608 P.2d at 641. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
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the least invasion to the body of the individual. "104 The court fur­
ther stated that the proponent must show by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence that current scientific and medical knowledge 
does not suggest either that a reversible sterilization procedure or 
other less drastic method will be available in the near future or 
that "science is on the threshold of an advance in the treatment of 
the individual's disability. "105 
The court concluded by emphasizing: 
[t]here is a heavy presumption against sterilization of an individ­
ual incapable of informed consent that must be overcome by the 
person or entity requesting sterilization. This burden will be 
even harder to overcome in the case of a minor incompetent, 
whose youth may make it difficult or impossible to prove by 
clear, cogent and convincing evidence that he or she will never 
be capable of making an informed judgment about sterilization 
or of caring for a child. lOS 
While the standards promulgated by the court seek to protect 
those most susceptible to abuse, such as minors, requiring evi­
dence of scientific and medical advancements may undercut the 
court's recognition that sterilization is warranted in some in­
stances. 107 This speculative standard may unduly frustrate a peti­
tioner's goals irrespective of the incompetent's age. 
The Hayes court, however, was the nrst to confront directly 
the problem of compiling substantive guidelines that sufficiently 
protect the rights of noninstitutionalized mentally retarded individ­
uals. The court's reliance on the best interest of the individual as 
the only acceptable state interest Jed it to develop standards that 
not only shield an individual from erroneous sterilization but that 
also provide a framework in which the legitimate desire of a peti­
tioner can be effectuated. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently followed Hayes' di­
rection by ruling that it is a court's responsibility to determine an 
incompetent individual's need for sterilization based solely on an 
examination of his or her best interest. 10S In re Grady109 reflects 
104. [d. at 238-39, 608 P.2d at 641. 
105. [d. at 239, 608 P.2d at 641. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. [I.t 242, 608 P.2d at 643 (concurring opinion). 
108. In re Grady, No. A-23, slip op. at 21,39-41 (N.]. Feb. 18, 1981). This deci­
sion explicitly rejected the trial court's holding that parents and guardians alone 
should determine and substitute consent. [d. at 19. See also note 98 supra for a 
discussion regarding the trial court decision. 
109. No. A-23 (N:J. Feb. 18, 1981). 
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the duty of a court to preserve an individual's privacy right to re­
productive autonomyllO as well as an "overriding concern to pre­
vent any abuse of judicial authority ...."111 Pursuant to these be­
liefs, the Grady court produced rigid procedural1l2 and substantive 
standards that would enable courts "to protect the human rights of 
people least able to protect themselves. "113 
The substantive standards developed by the court to provide 
guidance in determining when sterilization is in an individual's best 
interest parallel those set in Hayes. 114 Moreover, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court expanded the Hayes guidelines to include three 
additional factors: 
The possibility that the incompetent person will experience 
trauma or psychological damage if she becomes pregnant or 
gives birth, and, conversely, the possibility of trauma or psycho­
logical damage from the sterilization operation .... 
. . . The advisability of sterilization at the time of the application 
rather than in the future. While sterilization should not be post­
poned until unwanted pregnancy occurs, the court should be 
cautious not to authorize sterilization before it clearly has be­
come an advisable procedure. 
. . . A demonstration that the proponents of sterilization are 
seeking it in good faith and that their primary concern is for the 
best interests of the incompetent person rather than their own 
or the public's convenience,l15 
The major distinction among the criteria established in the two 
cases rests on a consideration of the individual's ability to parent. 
While both courts evinced a concern for whether an individual was 
permanently incapable of caring for a child even with assistance, 
they differed on the nature of proof required for such a determina­
tion. The Grady court stated that a trial judge must consider "[t]he 
ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the possi­
110. The court stated: 

[t]he right to choose among procreation, sterilization and other methods of 

contraception is an important privacy right of all individuals. Our court must 

preserve that right. Where an incompentent person lacks the mental capacity 

to make that choice, a court should ensure the exercise of that right on be­

half of the incompetent in a manner that reflects his or her best interests. 

Id. at 21. 
111. Id. at 39. 
112. The procedural safeguards and the guidelines governing the prerequisite 
finding of incompetency are analogous to those set by the Hayes court. Id. at 40-42. 
113. Id. at 54. 
114. Compare id. at 43-44 with text accompanying notes 103-105 supra. 
115. No. A-23, slip op. at 43-44. 
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bility that the incompetent may at some future date be able to 
marry and, with a spouse, care for a child. "116 This standard, un­
like that found in Hayes, 117 did not mandate the use of empirical 
evidence. Further, the Hayes court demanded a more searching 
inquiry into whether a parent's ability to provide child care would 
increase with "reasonable assistance. "118 This factor is substantially 
broader than consideration of what support a spouse can pro­
vide. 119 
Despite t.his difference, the safeguards evolved by both courts 
demonstrate a common regard for the protection of the rights and 
interests of incompetent individuals subject to sterilization. Their 
development of comprehensive substantive standards predicated on 
the best interest of the individual may hail a commendable trend 
toward closer examination of the constitutional rights implicated in 
sterilization proceedings. 
V. 	 PERTINENT EVIDENTIARY STANDARD OF PROOF: 
EVALUATION NECESSARY 
The amount of protection a fundamental right receives can 
vary not only with the nature of applicable procedural and substan­
tive standards but also with the requisite burden of proof. 120 
Traditionally, courts have employed three levels of proof. 121 In a 
civil case between private parties for monetary damages, "society 
has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits,"122 
so the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 123 In a 
criminal case, "where one party has at stake an interest of tran­
scending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty,"124 due pro­
cess requires that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 125 The intermediate standard of proof requires 
116. Id. at 44. 
117. See text accompanying note 103 supra. 
118. Id. 
119. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. 
120. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), in which Chief Justice 
Burger stated with regard to involuntary commitment proceedings: "[i]ncreasing the 
burden of proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the deci­
sion and thereby perhaps reduce the chances that inappropriate commitments will 
be ordered." Id. at 427. 
121. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 339, at 793 (2d ed. 1972). 
122. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
123. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
124. Id. at 364. 
125. Id. 
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clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and has been used to pro­
tect particularly important individual interests, such as reputation 
or citizenship, in various civil cases .126 
The appropriate standard of proof in any judicial proceeding 
depends upon the seriousness of the consequences of an erroneous 
judgment. 127 As the importance of the individual interest at stake 
increases, a proportionately higher standard of proof is required to 
reduce the risk of error. "In cases involving individual rights, 
whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] 
reflects the value society places on individual liberty.' "128 The 
clear and convincing standard has been applied uniformly in sterili­
zation determinations, usually without comment. 129 For example, 
one court, absent any analysis, rejected the preponderance of the 
evidence standard as insufficient protection and the beyond a rea­
sonable doubt standard as overprotective of the individual interest 
at stake. 130 
The courts' silent treatment of the pertinent standard of proof 
may be explained in light of Addington v. Texas .131 In Addington 
the Supreme Court confronted the question of what standard of 
proof should be used in an involuntary commitment proceeding. 132 
The Court, refusing to require the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, held that clear and convincing evidence was sufficient to 
guarantee due process. 133 Since Addington involved fundamental 
rights of a magnitude similar to th.ose implicated in a sterilization 
decision, the courts may have believed it unnecessary to address 
the proof issue. 134 A closer look at Addington precludes such a cur­
126. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). 
127. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also 
note 145 infra and accompanying text. 
128. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippett v. Mary­
land, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971». 
129. See, e.g., In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d at 237, 608 P.2d at 641; In re Penny N., 
414 A.2d at 543. . 
130. 414 A.2d at 543. 
131. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
132. Appellant's lengthy history of emotional difficulties began in 1969. In 
1975, after an arrest for threatening to assault his mother, appellant's mother filed a 
petition for his indefinite commitment. Id. at 421. At trial appellant claimed that 
there was no substantial basis for a conclusion that he was probably dangerous either 
to himself or to others. The jury found against appellant. On appeal, appellant ar­
gued that any standard of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt violated his pro­
cedural due process rights. Id. 
133. Id. at 431. 
134. See 170 N.J. Super. at 125-26 n.20, 405 A.2d at 865 n. 20. Both Addington 
and the nonconsensual sterilization cases involve important individual liberty inter­
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sory analysis. While the Court staunchly denied the need for the 
reasonable doubt standard, it left the states free to choose between 
the clear and convincing evidence and reasonable doubt stan­
dards. 13s State courts, when faced with the task of creating 
guidelines to govern a proceeding involVing such fundamental 
rights,136 should carefully examine the Addington rationale in con­
junction with a balancing of the individual and state interests. 137 
In Addington the Court advanced three major distinctions be­
tween civil and criminal proceedings. It used these distinctions to 
reject the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in civil commit­
ments. 138 The Court first recognized that the beyond a reasonable 
139doubt standard historically has been limited to criminal cases.
Allocating standards of proof according to a superficial categori­
zation such as civil or criminal fails to provide the evaluation of un­
derlying interests and rights that is required by due process. In 
prior decisions involving the due process requirements of juvenile 
proceedings, the Court explicitly rejected the civil-criminal la­
bels. 140 The nature of the deprivation rather than the nature of the 
proceeding determined what level of protection was afforded. 141 
The Addington Court "took great pains to delineate the 'civil' as­
pect of the involuntary commitment proceeding"142 in order to dis­
tinguish it from a criminal case and a juvenile proceeding that has 
"criminal overtones. "143 Despite this effort, the Court did not fore­
close the use of a reasonable doubt standard in civil cases but 
merely warned that courts "should hesitate to apply it too broadly 
or casually in noncriminal cases. "144 
ests. In Addington, the Court recognized that commibnent constituted a significant 
deprivation of liberty as well as creating "adverse social consequences" that can 
have "a very significant impact on the individual." 441 U.S. at 426. Likewise, sterili­
zation deprives individuals of the fundamental right to reproduce and may intrude 
upon the individual's right to privacy. See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text. 
Additionally, sterilization can have "longlasting detrimental emotional effects." 93 
Wash. 2d at 228, 608 P.2d at 635. See also note 55 supra. It may also pose a social 
barrier to those persons who are able to and desire to have families. 
135. 441 U.S. at 427. 
136. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra. 
137. Cj. In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233, 1237 (D.C. 1979). 
138. 441 U.S. at 428-31. 
139. Id. at 428. 
140. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 
(1967). 
141. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,50 (1967). 
142. Markey v. Wachtel, 264 S.E.2d 437, 443 (W. Va. 1979). 
143. Id. 
144. 441 U.S. at 428. 
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The second difference between civil and criminal proceedings 
asserted by the Court related to the respective risk and impact of 
an erroneous decision. 145 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
has its roots in the belief that in criminal cases it is better to allow 
a guilty person to go without punishment than for an innocent per­
son to be deprived of his or her liberty. 146 
A greater degree of caution in coming to a conclusion should be 
practiced to guard life or liberty against the consequences of a 
mistake always painful, and possibly irreparable, than is neces­
sary in civil cases, where . . . the issue must be settled in ac­
cordance with one view or the other, and the verdict is followed 
with positive results to one party or the other but not of so seri­
ous a nature. 147 
In civil commitments, the consequences of an erroneous decision 
were perceived differently. Civil confinement was viewed as a 
treatment measure in which the state had a legitimate interest. 148 
It was reasoned, therefore, that it was not "better for a mentally ill 
person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be 
committed"149 because those who genuinely require treatment 
would suffer the detriment of not receiving care. Further, an erro­
neous confinement, while undesired, is different from a criminal 
sentence in that "the layers of professional review and observation 
of the patient's condition . . . and the concern of family and friends 
generally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous 
commitment to be corrected. "150 This rationale does not apply in 
sterilization situations. Sterilization is an irreversible deprivation, 
the finality of which "is as predictable as the execution of one sen­
tenced to capital punishment. "151 The use of substantive standards 
that allow sterilization when in the person's best interest assures 
that sterilization will be prescribed only when a genuine need ex­
ists. Moreover, a person does not suffer from a lack of treatment if 
145. Id. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 121, at § 341, at 798-99; Ball, The 
Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of proof, 14 VAND. L. REV. 807, 
816 (1961). 
146. 441 U.S. at 428. 
147. Ellis v. Buzzell, 60 Me. 209, 213 (1872). 
148. 441 U.S. at 426. 
149. Id. at 429. 
150. Id. at 428-29. 
151. In re Flannery, 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2345 (Montgomery County Md. Cir. 
Ct. 1980). "There is no redemption for the individual [sterilized] ... Any experiment 
which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a ba­
sic liberty." 316 U.S. at 541. 
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nontherapeutic sterilization is denied. To the contrary, a noncon­
sensual sterilization denial leaves the individual's physical integrity 
intact. 152 . 
Finally, the practical problems of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt were offered by the Court as justifying the use of the lower 
standard. The decisionmaker's reliance upon fallible and uncertain 
psychiatric testimony raised "a serious question as to whether a 
state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt" that an individ­
ual should be committed. 153 A civil commitment proceeding in­
volvesa subjective determination of the person's mental condition 
and the likelihood that he or she will be dangerous in the fu­
ture. l54 This determination was characterized by the Court as de­
pendent upon the "subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagno­
sis. "155 It was contended that the focus on the inquiry in a criminal 
proceeding, unlike a civil commitment, is upon straightforward and 
objective factual questions. 156 Since psychiatric testimony plays a 
central role in determining the need for confined therapy, the 
Court precluded the use of a standard that demands certainty. 157 
Criminal cases, however, cannot accurately be described as 
free from subjective inquiries. State of mind often arises as a chief 
issue, especially when insanity is raised as a defense. In a criminal 
case, once the insanity defense is raised the evidentiary burden 
shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ac­
cused was sane at the time of the alleged crime. 158 One commenta­
tor has described this burden on the state as "practically impossi­
ble"159 to surmount. 
The distinction raised in Addington, even if taken at face 
152. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text. 
153. 441 U.S. at 429. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 430. 
156. Id. at 429-30. 
157. Id. 
158. D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 65-67 (1980). 
159. Id. at 68. The author emphasized this point by stating: 

[the state] must find an "expert" willing to testify that there is (or was!) 

nothing wrong with the defendant's mind that could possibly have dimin­

ished his ability to confonn his behavior to the requirements of law; [and] 

that the defendant labors under neither delusions nor hallucinations; that 

the defendant unquestionably knew the nature and consequences of his ac­

tions and judged these to be legally and morally, or least morally, right. Can 

any of this ever be proved beyond a reasonable doubt? 

Id. (emphasis in original). See also United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758, 761 (9th 
Cir. 1975). 
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value, does not apply with equal force to sterilization proceedings. 
The testimony of psychiatrists and mental health workers is impor­
tant in resolving sterilization questions, but the decisionmaker's re­
liance upon such testimony is not of the same degree as it is in 
commibnent hearings. The capabilities of a mentally retarded in­
competent are more easily ascertained than the degrees of mental 
illness. Additionally, the trier of fact will be well acquainted with 
the skills and qualities required of parents160 and will not be de­
pendent on the analysis and expertise of psychiatrists. The question 
of competency for consent purposes is subject to the practical proof 
problems raised in Addington. Such a determination necessarily in­
volves a subjective inquiry into the individual's mental state. 161 
The competency question is, however, a prerequisite to the central 
issue concerning whether sterilization is in the best interest of the 
individual. The use of a. different standard for these two separate 
questions does not appear unworkable. 
The differences between civil commitments and sterilization 
determinations mayor may not be suffiCient to constitutionally 
mandate use of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, a standard· 
traditionally reserved for criminal cases. The differences demon­
strate that selecting which standard to apply requires an assess­
ment of the underlying rights and social ·policies that a civil­
criminal categorization does not provide. Unfortunately, the 
uniform acceptance of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
in nonconsensual sterilization proceedings has occurred without 
this evaluation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nonconsensual sterilization has far-reaching implications for 
both society and the individual. Sterilization. of mentally retarded 
individuals involves the value. placed upon the individual's rights 
by society and the decisions and fears society has for its own evolu­
tion. Absent legislative guidance, courts that have faced these com­
plex issues must choose either to act. in a standardless environment 
or to generate their own guidelines. Unless courts create standards 
that recognize the full panoply of rights inherent in nonconsensual 
sterilization determinations, there is a great likelihood that abuse of 
an incompetent person's rights will occur. 
160. . See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text. 
161. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
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The traditional role of the judiciary as the protector of individ­
ual rights encompasses the responsibility to develop a decision­
making framework that reflects an individual's right to procedural 
and substantive due process. Comprehensive substantive standards 
must exist that incorporate action congruent with the best interest 
of the individual. An evaluation of both the individual and societal 
concerns compels a rejection of any other basis for judicial inter­
vention. The recognition of this basis for sterilization determina­
tions by the Washington and New Jersey Supreme Courts may in­
dicate a trend toward greater scrutiny of the mentally retarded 
person's constitutional rights. 
Courts must also evaluate what standard of proof is required 
by due process in light of the fundamental interests involved. 
While the Supreme Court in Addington squarely faced the issue of 
what evidentiary standard is constitutionally mandated in cases of 
civil commitments, that deCision, which found the clear and con­
vincing standard sufficient, merely represents a starting point for 
future analysis In other areas. An assessment of the underlying 
rights and policies implicit in sterilization is necessary to avoid the 
unjust results of a mechanical civil-criminal proof categorization. 
The greatest danger that standardless ordering of sterilization 
may have upon the mentally retarded is that their liberty may be 
forsaken by those who profess paternalistic and benevolent 
motives. The development of legal safeguards will protect the re­
tarded either from being coerced or unknowingly subjected to an 
unwarranted and irreversible sterilization procedure. 
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